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CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS AND THE 2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS IN THE U.S. AND 
ICELAND: WHAT CAN A SMALL TOWN ICELANDIC POLICE CHIEF TEACH THE 




  Politicians, journalists, and academics alike highlight the paucity of 
criminal prosecutions for senior financial executives in the United States in 
the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. One common argument for the lack of 
prosecutions is that, though industry players behaved recklessly, they did not 
behave criminally. This Article evaluates this claim by detailing the civil and 
small number of criminal actions actually taken, and by reviewing leading 
arguments about whether behavior before the crisis was criminal. Rejecting 
the “reckless innocence” explanation, this Article provides examples of 
criminal behavior that could have been prosecuted and reviews the literature 
on why there were few cases made, despite potential criminal activity. 
Though scholars identify numerous explanations, this Article argues a 
combination of inadequate investigatory resources and regulatory capture 
offers the best explanation. This Article then explains Iceland’s different 
approach and why it successfully criminally prosecuted senior executives 
from its three largest banks, among others. Though the size of the two 
economies and the impact of the crisis for each explain a large part of the 
different roads taken, the independence and outsider status of Iceland’s 
prosecutor also contributed to, and is instructive for, how the U.S. could 
structure its regulatory apparatus, should it want to prioritize prosecutions 
in the future. 
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Well, first on the issue of prosecutions on Wall Street, one of 
the biggest problems about the collapse of Lehmans and the 
subsequent financial crisis and the whole subprime lending 
fiasco is that a lot of that stuff wasn’t necessarily illegal, it was 
just immoral or inappropriate or reckless . . . I think part of 
people’s frustrations, part of my frustration, was a lot of 
practices that should not have been allowed weren’t 
necessarily against the law . . . . –Barack Obama1 
[T]here are two fundamental reforms that we need; one is to 
get adequate capital, and two, to get far higher levels of 
enforcement fraud statutes. Existing ones—I’m not even 
talking about new ones. Things were being done which were 
certainly illegal and clearly criminal in certain cases, which in 
fraud is a fact. Fraud creates very considerable instability in 
competitive markets. If you cannot trust your counterparties, 
it won’t work, and indeed we saw that it didn’t. -Alan 
Greenspan 2 
                                                          
1 Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, News Conference by the 
President (Oct. 6, 2011) [hereinafter Obama Press Release] (on file with Concordia Law 
Review). 
2 Alan Greenspan, Former Chairman, U.S. Fed. Reserve, Address at A Return to Jekyll 
Island: The Origins, History, and Future of the Federal Reserve (Nov. 6, 2010). 
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INTRODUCTION 
 In a 2013 poll, 53% of Americans believed the government had not 
sufficiently prosecuted bankers for their role in the financial crisis.3 Is a call 
for prosecutions anything more than uninformed anger at business elites, or 
did the individuals who played a role in the crisis do so within, and perhaps 
despite, the existing legal boundaries? This Article weighs in on this debate 
in the context of the United States and Iceland. While the U.S. failed to 
prosecute any senior Wall Street executives for their role in the crisis, Iceland 
jailed executives at its three largest banks, among others. Though the two 
countries differ in many respects, including their economies, their different 
responses to financial crisis prosecutions offer an opportunity to consider 
what lessons, if any, Iceland might offer the U.S. 
 This Article outlines the criminal and civil actions against firms in the 
United States following the financial crisis. Despite the frequent use of civil 
fines and criminal prosecutions of lower level industry players and small 
firms, there were no criminal prosecutions for senior Wall Street executives.  
Next, this Article surveys the various reasons why. The simplest answer is 
that bankers behaved carelessly, but not criminally. Rejecting this “reckless 
innocence” explanation, this Article provides examples of criminal behavior 
that could have been prosecuted, followed by several more plausible reasons 
criminal prosecutions were found wanting. It then suggests that more 
criminal cases should have been opened, using Iceland as a case study for 
how this could feasibly have been achieved. An explanation of how and why 
Iceland was successful follows, along with economic, political, and cultural 
reasons explaining why the two countries chose such different paths. This 
Article concludes with a discussion of lessons Iceland offers the U.S. and the 
implications the lack of prosecutions has for accountability in financial sector 
governance in the U.S. 
 
                                                          
3 Michael Erman, Five Years After Lehman, Americans Still Angry at Wall Street: 
Reuters/Ipsos Poll, REUTERS (Sept. 15, 2013, 5:03 AM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-wallstreet-crisis-idUSBRE98E06Q20130915. 
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I. ACTIONS TAKEN: CRIMINAL PROSECUTION AND CIVIL ENFORCEMENT 
A. Criminal Prosecutions of Individuals 
 Before reviewing the reasons why there were so few criminal 
prosecutions, it is worthwhile to take stock of what actions were taken. 
Though it is a popular conception that no individual has gone to jail as a result 
of actions relating to the financial crisis, the claim is misleading, but only 
mildly so. For example, the special inspector general for the Troubled Assets 
Relief Program (the primary bank bailout program post financial crisis) 
reported to Congress in 2016 that 35 bankers were sent to prison as a result 
of her office’s fraud investigations.4 Though many were individuals at 
smaller banks, a few top executives at banks with assets upwards of $10 
billion were also convicted. For example, Edward Woodard, the CEO of the 
Bank of the Commonwealth of Norfolk, was sentenced to 23 years for fraud.5 
However, these cases are from fraud in the use of bailout funds, not for 
actions that created the financial crisis.  
 Further, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has been active in 
prosecuting mortgage fraud. According to a report by the Department of 
Justice (DOJ) Office of Inspector General, the FBI reached 2,760 convictions 
for mortgage fraud between 2009 and 2011.6 However, these were relatively 
low-level individuals, including mortgage brokers, fraudulent buyers and 
appraisers, and fraudulent loan applicants.7 A few higher level bankers were 
jailed in separate cases by the DOJ. Lee Farkas, chairman of Taylor, Bean & 
Whitaker, the twelfth largest mortgage lender at the time,8 was convicted of 
fourteen counts for fraud and conspiracy by the DOJ in a $2.9 billion scandal 
that included selling fraudulent loans to government agencies.9 Additionally, 
Lorraine Brown, the CEO of a loan processing company, received five years 
in prison for helping banks with fraudulent paperwork related to subprime 
                                                          
4 Chris Isidore, 35 Bankers Were Sent to Prison for Financial Crisis Crimes, CNN 
BUSINESS, (Apr. 28, 2016, 6:53 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/04/28/news/companies/ 
bankers-prison/. 
5 Id. 
6 AUDIT DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., AUDIT REP. 14-12, AUDIT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 
JUSTICE’S EFFORTS TO ADDRESS MORTGAGE FRAUD (2014). 
7 See Robert Quigley, The Impulse Towards Individual Criminal Punishment After the 
Financial Crisis, 22 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 103, 108 (2015). 
8 Id. 
9 Floyd Norris, After Years of Red Flags, a Conviction, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/22/business/22norris.html. 
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home foreclosures in the wake of the crisis.10 Though U.S. Attorneys 
considered criminal cases against executives at large failed mortgage lenders 
and banks, including Countrywide, Indymac, and Washington Mutual, as well 
as the insurance company American International Group (AIG), these were 
eventually closed without charges.11  
 On Wall Street, two mid-level traders at Credit Suisse were convicted 
in 2010 for misrepresenting investments, as well as a trader at Jeffries, LLC, 
who defrauded the government and investors by misrepresenting the price of 
mortgage-backed securities.12 The most senior person for a Wall Street 
investment bank to go to prison was Kareem Serageldin,13 who worked for 
Credit Suisse and was found guilty of falsifying records to his superiors 
related to mortgage trading.14 However, his portrayal as a significant 
prosecution may be overstated. He was only middle management, his crime 
did not relate much to the crisis, and the victim was his employer, not the 
public.15 The focus on Serageldin as the most senior Wall Street official to go 
to prison misses the point—he got so much attention because there was 
simply no one else to focus on.16 In other instances, the DOJ was unsuccessful 
in its criminal prosecution of individuals, most prominently in the case of two 
Bear Sterns executives.17 According to U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder, 
the DOJ did its best to prosecute, but the cases were too weak.18  
                                                          
10 Don Mayer et al., Crime and Punishment (or the Lack Thereof) for Financial Fraud in the 
Subprime Mortgage Meltdown: Reasons and Remedies for Legal and Ethical Lapses, 51 AM. 
BUS. L.J. 515, 516 n.5 (2014). 
11 GREGG BARAK, THEFT OF A NATION: WALL STREET LOOTING AND FEDERAL 
REGULATORY COLLUDING 86–87 (2012); see also Jason M. Breslow, As Deadlines Loom for 
Financial Crisis Cases, Prosecutors Weigh Their Options, PBS: FRONTLINE (Jan. 22, 
2013), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/as-deadlines-loom-for-financial-crisis-
cases-prosecutors-weigh-their-options/. 
12 Todd Haugh, The Most Senior Wall Street Official: Evaluating the State of Financial Crisis 
Prosecutions, 9 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 153, 168–69 (2015). 
13 Jesse Eisinger, Why Only One Top Banker Went to Jail for the Financial Crisis, N.Y. 
TIMES MAG. (Apr. 30, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/04/magazine/only-one-
top-banker-jail-financial-crisis.html?_r=0. 
14 Haugh, supra note 12, at 157. 
15 Id. at 156. 
16 Id. at 157.  
17 See generally Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives 
Been Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/ 
01/09/financial-crisis-why-no-executive-prosecutions/. 
18 Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., National Press Club Luncheon with Attorney General Eric Holder 
(Feb. 17, 2015). U.S. Attorney General Holder further noted: 
106 CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS AND THE 2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS Vol. 4 
 
 In early 2015, Holder gave U.S. Attorneys 90 days to come up with 
cases to charge individual Wall Street executives, but the deadline passed 
without any significant action due to the statute of limitations.19 Based on 
these results, with only a few exceptions, there have been no significant 
criminal prosecutions for senior financial executives and their actions related 
to the financial crisis: “the number of criminal convictions of truly high-level 
executives related to the financial crisis stands at zero.”20 This number stands 
in sharp contrast with Iceland’s aggressive stance, as well as the US’ 
prosecutorial aggression after the savings and loan crisis in the 1980s, after 
which over 1,000 individuals and executives who went to prison, despite that 
crisis being much smaller in magnitude.21  
B. Criminal Prosecution of Banks 
 What about criminal prosecutions of banks rather than the individuals 
working for them? To punish banks, the DOJ relied primarily on non-
prosecution agreements and deferred prosecution agreements, rather than 
criminal convictions. Non-prosecution agreements are agreements between 
the company and the DOJ that the company will take action to correct its 
wrongdoing.22 Deferred prosecution agreements are stronger in that they 
                                                          
So I think that what we have done has been appropriate. As I say, we have 
this ongoing examination of whether individual cases ought to be brought. 
But to the extent that individuals have not been prosecuted, people should 
understand it is not for lack of trying. These are the kinds of cases that 
people come to the Justice Department to make. Young people who want 
to be assistant U.S. attorneys in the southern district of New York and 
eastern district of Virginia, San Francisco, live for these big cases. The 
inability to make them, at least to this point, has not been as a result of a 
lack of effort.  
Id. 
19 See Alison Fitzgerald, Bankers From Major Institutions Still Haven’t Been Held 
Responsible for Financial Crash, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (May 22, 2015, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.publicintegrity.org/2015/05/22/17377/bankers-major-institutions-still-havent-
been-held-responsible-financial-crash. 
20 Haugh, supra note 12, at 158. 
21 William D. Cohan, How Wall Street’s Bankers Stayed Out of Jail, ATLANTIC, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/09/how-wall-streets-bankers-stayed-
out-of-jail/399368/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2019). This Article returns to this point and whether 
the S&L crisis provides a fair point of comparison, below. 
22 See Len Lyons & Audra Marino, Deferred Prosecution Agreements, Non-Prosecution 
Agreements and Monitoring Services, MARCUM, http://www.marcumllp.com/insights-
news/deferred-prosecution-agreements-non-prosecution-agreements-and-monitoring-
services (last visited Feb. 16, 2019). 
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involve the DOJ filing criminal charges in court but agreeing to withdraw 
them pending corporate reforms and the appointment of an outside party to 
monitor compliance with the terms of the agreement.23 Both usually include 
large criminal fines. After being used against banks and financial institutions 
rarely between 2001 and 2014, the use of non-prosecution agreements 
jumped dramatically in 2015 to 80.24 Yet, these agreements rarely target 
individuals working for the institutions.25 Further, the rise in recent 
agreements serves as a poor proxy for actions related to the financial crisis, 
as most are unrelated to it. Most of the agreements in 2015 instead resulted 
from a large effort by the DOJ Tax Division to fight illegal tax shelters.26 The 
first time the DOJ obtained admissions of guilt for criminal charges after the 
financial crisis was in 2015, in a case unrelated to the financial crisis.27 
Citicorp, JPMorgan Chase & Co., Barclays Plc, and Royal Bank of Scotland 
Plc all paid fines of $5.8 billion for colluding to manipulate currency 
markets.28 To see actions by the DOJ and other regulators related to the 
financial crisis, it is necessary to look to civil, not criminal, penalties.  
C. Civil Penalties for Individuals and Banks 
 Instead of criminal charges, the government has relied primarily on 
civil penalties to hold banks accountable for their actions related to the 
financial crisis. According to U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) reports, the agency was responsible for settlements against hundreds 
of individuals and organizations to the tune of several billion dollars in 
fines.29 Table 1 below is taken from that SEC report. 
                                                          
23 Id. 
24 Brandon Garrett, The Rise of Bank Prosecutions, 126 YALE L.J.F. 33, 36–37 (2016). Prior 
to 2010, fewer than non-prosecution agreements were used at a rate of less than 10 per year. 
Id. 
25 Id. at 46. 
26 Id. at 38. 
27 See Fitzgerald, supra note 19. 
28 David McLaughlin et al., Six Banks Pay $5.8 Billion, Five Guilty of Market Rigging, 
BLOOMBERG (last updated May 20, 2015, 10:56 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-20/six-banks-pay-5-8-billion-five-
plead-guilty-to-market-rigging. 
29 See SEC Enforcement Actions: Addressing Misconduct That Led To or Arose From the 
Financial Crisis, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/enf-actions-fc.shtml (last modified Feb. 22, 2017). 
Interestingly, many of these cases are against repeat offenders who promised not to do the 
same thing again in past settlements with the SEC; see Edward Wyatt, Promises Made, and 
Remade, by Firms in S.E.C. Fraud Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2011),  




Number of Entities and Individuals 
Charged 
204 
Number of CEOs, CFOs, and Other 
Senior Corporate Officers Charged 
93 
Number of Individuals Who have 
Received Officer and Director Bars, 
Industry Bars, or Commissions 
Suspensions 
54 
Penalties Ordered or Agreed To > $.193 billion 
Disgorgement and Prejudgment Interest 
Ordered or Agreed To 
> $1.47 billion 
Additional Monetary Relief Obtained for 
Harmed Investors 
$418 million 
Total Penalties, Disgorgement, and Other 
Monetary Relief 
> $3.76 billion 
 
According to an analysis that tried to capture fines from all regulators, banks 
have paid out fines in excess of $204 billion.31 A similar analysis found that, 
                                                          
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/08/business/in-sec-fraud-cases-banks-make-and-break-
promises.html. 
30 SEC Enforcement Actions: Addressing Misconduct That Led To or Arose From the 
Financial Crisis, supra note 29 (statistics current as of Oct. 7, 2016). Table was taken 
directly from source. Id. The “Additional Monetary Relief Obtained for Harmed Investors” 
came from “settlements with Evergreen, J.P. Morgan, State Street, TD Ameritrade, and 
Claymore Advisors.” Id. 
31 Jeff Cox, Misbehaving Banks Have Now Paid $204B in Fines, CNBC (Oct. 30, 2015, 
1:58 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/10/30/misbehaving-banks-have-now-paid-204b-in-
fines.html. This calculation includes all settlements in the financial crisis era since 2009, so 
it probably overstates the size of settlements related directly to the financial crisis. Id. 
However, the data also does not include settlements under $100 million, so it understates 
the total as well. Id. 
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in 100 mortgage-related settlements since 2009, banks have paid $164 billion 








Bank of America 24 $71.23 
JPMorgan Chase 13 $31.07 
Citigroup 9 $12.26 
Wells Fargo 8 $10.56 
Deutsche Bank 2 $9.13 
Morgan Stanley 9 $7.92 
Goldman Sachs 7 $7.26 
Credit Suisse 3 $6.28 
 
One final way to measure the financial impact of the crisis on firms is the cost 
of litigation, which for the largest financial firms, hit $306 billion for the 
years between 2010 and 2015.34  
II. WHY WERE THERE SO FEW CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS? 
A. Careless, Not Criminal 
 The most consistent answer to this question from most politicians 
and banks is that executives did not engage in any criminal behavior related 
to the crisis. In other words, there were few criminal prosecutions because 
there was little to prosecute. Perhaps executives made poor decisions, but 
they presented the argument that stupidity, ignorance, recklessness, and 
                                                          
32 Dealbook, Where Does the Mortgage Settlement Money Go?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/23/business/dealbook/24mortgagelist.html. 
33 Id. 
34 Ben McLannahan, Banks’ Post-Crisis Legal Costs Hit $300bn, FIN. TIMES, (June 8, 2015, 
12:04 AM), https://www.ft.com/content/debe3f58-0bd8-11e5-a06e-00144feabdc0. 
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decisions that turned out poorly in retrospect cannot be criminalized. This 
general claim has been made by a variety of people, most notably by the 
President of the United States, Barack Obama. During a 2011 press 
conference, the President argued that: 
Well, first on the issue of prosecutions on Wall Street, one of 
the biggest problems about the collapse of Lehmans and the 
subsequent financial crisis and the whole subprime lending 
fiasco is that a lot of that stuff wasn’t necessarily illegal, it was 
just immoral or inappropriate or reckless. That’s exactly why 
we needed to pass Dodd-Frank, to prohibit some of these 
practices. 
 The financial sector is very creative and they are 
always looking for ways to make money. That’s their job. And 
if there are loopholes and rules that can be bent and arbitrage 
to be had, they will take advantage of it. So without 
commenting on particular prosecutions—obviously that’s not 
my job; that’s the Attorney General’s job—I think part of 
people’s frustrations, part of my frustration, was a lot of 
practices that should not have been allowed weren’t 
necessarily against the law, but they had a huge destructive 
impact. And that’s why it was important for us to put in place 
financial rules that protect the American people from reckless 
decision-making and irresponsible behavior.35 
When speaking about his efforts, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder argued 
that the prosecutorial effort was there, but the cases were not. “The inability 
to make [cases], at least to this point, has not been as a result of a lack of 
effort.”36 Under Holder, the head of the DOJ Criminal Division, Lanny 
Breuer, argued similarly by saying “[i]f there had been a case to make, we 
would have brought it. I would have wanted nothing more, but it doesn’t work 
that way.”37 Breuer said during a 60 Minutes interview, “I get it. I find the 
excessive risk taking to be offensive. . . . I may personally share the same 
frustration that American people all over the country are feeling, that in and 
of itself doesn’t mean we bring a criminal case.”38  
                                                          
35 Obama Press Release, supra note 1. 
36 Cohan, supra note 21. 
37 Ben Protess, Breuer Reflects on Prosecutions That Were, and Weren’t, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
28, 2013, 8:49 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/02/28/breuer-reflects-on-
prosecutions-that-were-and-werent. 
38 60 Minutes, Prosecuting Wall Street, CBS NEWS (Dec. 5, 2011), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/prosecuting-wall-street/. 
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 Further, many of the transactions during the housing bubble were 
between sophisticated investors in which one party made a bad bet.39 Trades 
that large Wall Street banks made where they handpicked bad assets and 
packaged them in investments and sold them to investors are cases of poor 
decisions on the investors who bought them, not illegal transactions. Because 
both parties were sophisticated, the idea that one party was duped by another 
is suspect. Rather, the sophisticated parties had different views about the 
future performance of particular securities.40 Referring to a case that Citibank 
settled, one commentator argued “even really bad deals like Citigroup’s, 
aren’t illegal. They’re not criminal. They’re not inherently fraudulent. If 
Citigroup’s clients, all of them sophisticated institutional investors, were 
foolish or careless enough to buy what Citigroup sold them, then arguably 
they deserved their losses.”41 Simply put, under current law, alleged 
“negligence, recklessness, [and] failure to supervise for those who control the 
levers of financial institutions” are not serious crimes.42 
 Similarly, more theoretically-driven arguments from academics make 
the case that the crisis was not a product of criminal behavior; hence, criminal 
prosecutions should not be expected. According to U.S. Circuit Judge 
Richard Posner, misaligned incentives encouraged the reckless behavior that 
led to individually rational decisions that in turn led to collectively irrational 
and disastrous outcomes.43 For example, though the deterioration of lending 
                                                          
39 Samuel W. Buell, Is the White Collar Offender Privileged?, 63 DUKE L.J. 823, 847 (2014). 
40 Id. 
41 James B. Stewart, Few Avenues for Justice in the Case Against Citi, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 
2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/03/business/few-avenues-for-justice-in-the-citi-
case.html?mtrref=www.bing.com&gwh=2B41B1843AFD303B40FD02649FF594DB&gwt
=pay. Lanny Breuer argues the same when discussing similar transactions:  
In a criminal case...I have to prove not only that you made a false statement 
but that you intended to commit a crime, and also that the other side of the 
transaction relied on what you were saying. And frankly, in many of the 
securitizations and the kinds of transactions we’re talking about, in reality 
you had very sophisticated counterparties on both sides. And so even 
though one side may have said something was dark blue when really we 
can say it was sky blue, the other side of the transaction, the other 
sophisticated party, wasn’t relying at all on the description of the color. 
Rakoff, supra note 17.  
42 See Buell, supra note 39, at 853. Others argue that there are laws that criminalize these 
very things. See infra notes 48–75.  
43 See RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ‘08 AND THE DESCENT 
INTO DEPRESSION (2009). Posner does not actually link his argument to the debate about 
financial crisis prosecutions, but the link follows logically from his primary explanatory 
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standards was collectively dangerous, it was individually rational for lenders 
to continue or be driven out of business.44 Others argue that the crisis was a 
product of mistaken beliefs, cognitive failures,45 and flawed human 
psychology that explained away signs of a brewing crisis, combined with 
irrational exuberance that the housing market would not collapse.46 The crisis 
can also be explained as a “normal accident” that resulted from complex and 
tightly-coupled technology and relationships in the financial sector, rather 
than fraud or weak regulation.47 Though these theorists explain the crisis in a 
way that minimizes the role of illegal behavior, others argue fraud is not 
possible in an efficient market. According to legal and economic scholars, 
who take the “fraud minimalist position,” fraud cannot exist for long in a 
competitive market because competitive pressures would unearth fraudulent 
information and force duplicitous actors and firms out of business.48 This 
view may go as far as to suggest we may not even need laws for fraud.49  
 The argument that there were no prosecutions because the conduct was 
not criminal has been critiqued by a wide variety of scholars. For U.S. District 
Judge Jed Rakoff, the claim is suspicious on its face. Before the crisis, reports 
of mortgage fraud skyrocketed, and in 2004, the FBI issued warnings of a 
growing mortgage fraud epidemic; and these fraudulent loans spread 
throughout the financial system.50 Additionally, Judge Rakoff argues that the 
                                                          
mechanism for the crisis; people behaving rationally within a system of misaligned 
incentives can cause a crisis without engaging in criminal behavior.  
44 For a discussion of the system’s perverse incentives, see id. ch. 1–2. 
45 See generally Arnold Kling, The Financial Crisis: Moral Failure or Cognitive Failure, 33 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 507 (2010). Kling argues key actors in the market believed things 
that turned out to be wrong. Id. at 508. Regulators believed the same things, and thus did not 
crack down more on risky industry practices. Id. 
46 Quigley, supra note 7, at 145–47. 
47 See Donald Palmer & Michael W. Maher, The Mortgage Meltdown as Normal Accidental 
Wrongdoing, 8 STRATEGIC ORG. 83, 88 (2010). Though others have treated normal accidents 
and moral wrongdoing as mutually exclusive, they do not think they need to be treated as 
such. Id. Wrongdoing can contribute to normal accidents, and normal accidents can 
encourage wrongdoing, which can lead law enforcement to be more attentive to cracking 
down on wrongdoing. Id. For a contrasting perspective from the originator of the concept of 
normal accidents, see Charles Perrow, The Meltdown Was Not an Accident, in 30A MARKETS 
ON TRIAL: THE ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY OF THE U.S. FINANCIAL CRISIS: PART A 309 (Paul M. 
Hirsch & Michael Lounsbury eds., 2010). 
48 Henry N. Pontell et al., Too Big to Fail, Too Powerful to Jail? On the Absence of Criminal 
Prosecutions After the 2008 Financial Meltdown, 61 CRIME, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE 1, 
5 (2014) [hereinafter Too Big to Fail, Too Powerful to Jail?]. 
49 Id. 
50 Rakoff, supra note 17.  
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Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission’s official report on the causes of the 
crisis mentions fraud frequently.51 Given evidence of billowing smoke 
throughout the housing market and financial system, can one not find fire?  
 Moreover, attempts to undertake criminal prosecutions were mitigated 
due to inadequate resources and competing priorities at the FBI and DOJ.52 
Put differently, resources and prioritization of other types of cases, rather than 
the absence of criminal behavior, could explain under prosecution of criminal 
behavior related to the crisis. Prosecutors also make decisions about whether 
to pursue civil or criminal cases. White-collar criminologists do not make a 
strong distinction between civil and criminal cases.53 Prosecutors may pursue 
civil actions for a variety of reasons unrelated to the criminal substance of the 
offender’s actions: from ease and lack of resources, to the desire to inspire 
public confidence with swift civil action.  Thus, the large civil penalties were 
a choice, not necessarily an indication that criminal conduct was minimal.54  
 These general arguments beg for more specificity. Based on the 
available evidence, can the case be made that particular financial industry 
actions violated criminal fraud statutes at the time? A variety of scholars have 
made this case.55 The arguments are too many to detail here, but a few will 
suffice to make the point that there is substantial evidence of cases that could 
have been pursued. 
 One area many scholars have pointed to for criminal behavior is 
investment banks’ sale of mortgage securities called Collateralized Debt 
Obligations (CDO).56 For example, as the crisis began to unfold, Goldman 
                                                          
51 Id. 
52 Id. For more detailed discussion on this point, see infra Section II(F). 
53 See EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME: THE UNCUT VERSION (1983). 
54 JOHN HAGAN, WHO ARE THE CRIMINALS? THE POLITICS OF CRIME POLICY FROM THE 
AGE OF ROOSEVELT TO THE AGE OF REAGAN 44–46 (rev. ed. 2012). 
55 See infra notes 56–76.  
56 See generally FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY 
REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL 
AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES (2011). CDOs are a tiered financial product 
divided into tranches, according to level of risk. Id. at 43. In the case of the financial crisis, 
CDO tranches were composed of pools of Mortgage Backed Securities, which were in turn 
composed of pools of mortgages. Id. at 117–18. The top tranche was composed of the safest 
mortgages or mortgage pools (usually rated AAA by the rating agencies, a rating only a few 
companies and US government treasury bonds enjoyed), and lower tranches rated BBB and 
below, according to the risk of the mortgages the tranche contained. Id. at 71. The lower the 
tranche, the higher the interest payment to investors. Id. The monthly payments of 
homeowners were funneled through the security tranches to investors. Id. at 13. If 
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Sachs realized it had a lot of soon-to-be worthless housing assets that it 
wanted to unload (such as the Hudson CDO, which it was able to sell to 
investors).57 Though it included assets on Goldman’s books, the CDO 
prospectus describing the product explicitly stated in the sales statement that 
it was not composed of assets on the firm’s balance sheet.58 This statement is 
important because, at that point in time, buyers were wary of buying assets 
that were being unloaded by institutions, suggesting that a more accurate 
disclosure may have prevented Goldman from making the sale.59 This 
omission violates Rule 10b-5 of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act.60 The 
Hudson deal had the essential elements of the offense: “it must be a 
misstatement of omission that is sufficiently material to affect an investor’s 
opinion; that it is made intentionally; that the investor relied upon in making 
his decision; and that directly caused actual losses.”61 
 Others have made similar cases against Goldman for securities deals 
as well as similar securities sold by other large banks.62 Securities fraud 
statutes could be used to go after mortgage-related securities and actors all 
along the securitization chain, from mortgage originators, who 
misrepresented the assets when they sold loans to securitizers, to those who 
packaged these mortgaged backed securities into more complex mortgage 
securities (CDOs), and the misrepresentations related to the sale of insurance 
on these CDOs.63 
 Another missed opportunity was criminal prosecution of Angelo 
Mozilo, the head of Countrywide, one of the largest subprime lenders before 
the crisis. Mozilo’s civil settlement with the SEC resulted in a $22.5 million 
fine, though it was small in comparison to his $500 million salary while 
                                                          
homeowners began to default, those in the bottom tranches were first to stop receiving 
payments. Id. at 43, 145. 
57See U.S. S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, WALL STREET AND THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE 7–11 (2011), 
http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/Financial_Crisis/FinancialCrisisReport.pdf.   
58 CHARLES H. FERGUSON, PREDATOR NATION: CORPORATE CRIMINALS, POLITICAL 
CORRUPTION, AND THE HIJACKING OF AMERICA 133–34 (2012). 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 191. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 133, 192 (discussing Goldman’s Hudson and Timberwolf deals); see also Mayer et 
al., supra note 10, at 552 (arguing that Goldman’s Abacus deal is a clear example of 
securities fraud); see also Rakoff, supra note 17 (arguing Deutsche Bank committed 
securities fraud in the sale of some of its CDOs). 
63 FERGUSON, supra note 58, at 191–92. 
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working for the company between 2000 and 2008.64 According to the SEC 
settlement, Mozilo mislead investors by not disclosing the inherent risk of 
Countrywide’s mortgage products; a risk he acknowledged privately, but not 
publicly.65 In emails, Mozilo described the products as “toxic” and said there 
was no way to accurately predict their performance, though he heralded these 
products publicly.66 A variety of scholars and legal professionals argue this 
conduct was worthy of criminal prosecution.67  
 Scholars also argue for prosecutions for a variety of other actors, 
including Lehman,68 AIG,69 the ratings agencies,70 various loan securitizers,71 
and a variety of executives who lied during congressional testimony.72 
Charles Ferguson, Mary Kreiner Ramirez, and Steven Ramirez make the 
most comprehensive case, documenting potential crimes related to: securities 
fraud, accounting fraud, mail fraud, bribery, perjury, Sarbanes-Oxley 
certifications of false statements, RICO offenses, antitrust violations, federal 
                                                          
64 See Colin Maher, Crisis Not Averted: Lack of Criminal Prosecutions Leave Limited 
Consequences for Those Responsible for the Financial Crisis, 39 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & 
CIV. CONFINEMENT 459, 463 (2013). 
65 Id. at 472.  
66 Id. at 472–73.  
67 See HAGAN, supra note 54 (arguing that this behavior qualities under even the most basic 
definitions of criminal fraud); see also Maher, supra note 64, at 463–65 (arguing the DOJ 
could use the same provisions in the Securities and Exchange Act the SEC used in its 
settlement); see also Marty Robins, Why Have Top Executives Escaped Prosecution?, N.Y. 
REV. BOOKS at Jed S. Rakoff replies (April 3, 2014) (agreeing that Mozilo could be 
prosecuted under securities fraud statutes and adds that statutes for bank fraud, mail fraud, 
and wire fraud also criminalize false statements about mortgage-backed securities); but see 
Matthew Goldstein, Angelo Mozilo Will Not Face U.S. Charges for Mortgage Fraud, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 17, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/18/business/angelo-mozilo-wil-
not-face-us-charges-for-mortgage-fraud.html?_r=0 (arguing the DOJ obviously decided not 
to pursue criminal prosecution); contra Michael Levi, Commentary, 42 CONTEMP. SOC. 683–
86 (2013) (arguing that Mozilo was responding to pressures of the market to keep him in 
business, albeit in a reckless way). 
68 See Ben Protess & Susanne Craig, Inside the End of the U.S. Bid To Punish Lehman 
Executives, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2013, 8:57 PM), 
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/09/08/inside-the-end-of-the-u-s-bid-to-punish-lehman-
executives/. 
69 See YVES SMITH, ECONNED: HOW UNENLIGHTENED SELF INTEREST UNDERMINED 
DEMOCRACY AND CORRUPTED CAPITALISM (2010). 
70 HAGAN, supra note 54, at 208.  
71 Quigley, supra note 7, at 140–41. 
72 HAGAN, supra note 54. In trying to refute the claim they bet against their clients, Goldman 
CEO Lloyd Blankfein said Goldman did not in fact bet against its clients and did not have 
massive short position, when there is abundant documentation these claims are false from 
the SEC’s settlement. Further, Goldman’s own documents refer to being short thousands of 
times. 
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aid disclosure regulations, and a variety of personal conduct offenses, like 
drug use.73 These actions all took place within what white-collar crime 
scholars call a criminogenic environment at particular banks74 and the 
broader mortgage lending and securitization industry.75 Perhaps the most 
blatant example of crime, and a telling example of the government’s 
unwillingness to pursue even the most straightforward case, is the foreclosure 
crisis that followed the housing crisis. Despite being a relatively easy case to 
make, the government backed down and settled with major banks involved. 
According to Mayer et al.,: 
[T]he February 2012 fraudulent mortgage foreclosure 
settlement—well within any statute of limitations—is 
sufficient evidence that the government is not all that serious 
about pursuing criminal charges against any major bank or 
high-level bank employee: robo-signing and false affidavits 
made to the courts are historically the stuff of which perjury 
convictions are made. That is, there are enough smoking guns 
in the HUD Inspector General’s report to signal a firestorm of 
fraud. Yet it appears that when the stakes are high to the 
banking industry, even though the fraud is clear, manifest, and 
easily documented, the federal government will yield to 
lobbying and highly paid lawyering, declare victory for the 
public, and move on.76 
 One might counter-argue that the above accounts amount to little 
more than “armchair prosecution,” which elides the difficult realities of 
gathering evidence, making a detailed case before a jury, and meeting the 
high burden of proof for criminal cases, beyond a reasonable doubt. To some 
extent this criticism is fair, and this Article returns to this question in more 
detail below. However, a similar argument could be made in response; 
without actually attempting more criminal cases against financial executives, 
the argument that prosecutions are too difficult is untested as well and 
amounts to “armchair non-prosecution.” In previous white-collar crime 
cases, prosecutors were able to gather the necessary evidence to convict 
                                                          
73 FERGUSON, supra note 58, at 190. See also MARY KREINER RAMIREZ & STEVEN A. 
RAMIREZ, THE CASE FOR THE CORPORATE DEATH PENALTY: RESTORING LAW AND ORDER 
ON WALL STREET (2017). 
74 Mayer et al., supra note 10, at 537–48 (arguing that Ameriquest and Countrywide were 
committing fraud on a daily basis, making it part of their organizational culture and practice). 
75 Too Big to Fail, Too Powerful to Jail?, supra note 47, at 3. 
76 Mayer et al., supra note 10, at 573. 
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white-collar criminals; doing so is more a function of effort than the 
particularities of the case.77 Regardless, the above examples suggest that 
many market actors went beyond acting rationally within the scope of 
existing law, stepping outside it to enhance their own gains. Perhaps these 
cases would not stick in court, but we will never know because so many of 
them were not pursued, were dropped, or were punished through civil suits. 
Together, these suggest the reckless innocence excuse is weaker than its 
proponents suggest. If cases were actually there to be litigated, but were not, 
it is necessary to probe further into why there were few prosecutions because 
the argument for reckless innocence is an insufficient explanation. 
B. Prosecutorial Choice  
 There are several reasons prosecutors may prefer civil over criminal 
cases, even in cases of suspected criminal wrongdoing. Suits related to 
mortgage fraud may be filed in civil rather than criminal courts to get 
restitution for victims, rather than stigmatize actors with criminal penalties.78 
Additionally, civil cases are easier to pursue, and can be brought more often.79 
The higher burden of proof for criminal cases may deter risk-averse 
prosecutors who want to make an easier, quicker case to impose civil fines.80 
Civil cases do not need a unanimous jury,81 and juries tend to be more 
sympathetic to victims in civil cases where money, rather than jail time, is the 
punishment.82 Additionally, in a civil case, the victim and her claims are the 
central issue, rather than being sidelined as a witness for a criminal case. 
Further, defendants must testify in a civil case because they cannot exercise 
their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.83 Lastly, as a 
practical matter, it is not clear whether criminal prosecutions for white-collar 
offenders are the best approach to deter crime. Some scholars argue we do 
not have the evidence to answer whether criminal prosecution is an effective 
deterrent for white-collar crime.84 Other scholars are less ambivalent, arguing 
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78 HAGAN, supra note 5454, at 198. 
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for or against effective deterrence, but the claims either way admittedly lack 
strong empirical evidence.85 
C. Statute of Limitations 
 Another constraint for prosecutions is the statute of limitations. There 
is a five-year statute of limitations for most relevant federal criminal 
provisions.86 Under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, as amended by 
Sarbanes-Oxley in 2002, prosecutors have two years after discovery to act or 
five years after the violation (whichever is earlier) to file charges.87 Most of 
the potential criminal behavior happened in 2005 and 2006, so by the time 
the federal government started seriously investigating mortgage fraud in 
2012, the five-year window had passed.88 There is a ten-year statute of 
limitations for fraud and false statements related to financial institutions for 
mail, wire, and bank fraud statutes if the fraud affects a financial institution.89 
The time has run out for these as well. The statute of limitations is much 
longer for organized crime statutes,90 but few have argued for prosecutions 
using them.91 Consequently, going forward there may be a need to change the 
statute of limitations for bank prosecutions.92 
D. Too Big to Jail 
 Attorney General Eric Holder worried that some financial institutions 
were too big to prosecute criminally given the potential detrimental 
macroeconomic impacts. During congressional testimony, Holder argued, 
“[i]t does become difficult for us to prosecute them when we are hit with 
                                                          
adequately answered.”); see also HAGAN, supra note 54, at 689 (“[W]e have much to learn 
about the relationship between financial crimes and their deterrence through criminal law 
enforcement.”). 
85 See Tristan R. Brown, Nobody Goes to Jail: The Economics of Criminal Law, Securities 
Fraud, and the 2008 Recession, 41 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 343 (2015) 
(using a law and economics approach and cost benefit analysis to argue that criminal 
prosecutions would be an effective deterrent in the cases of financial crisis); see also IAN 
AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE 
DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992) (commenting on responsive regulation as an alternative to 
criminal punishment to achieve corporate reforms for white-collar deviance). 
86 Richman, supra note 77, 265–66.  
87 BARAK, supra note 11, at 96. 
88 See Cohan, supra note 21. 
89 Haugh, supra note 12, at 194. 
90 Richman, supra note 77, at 265–66. 
91 FERGUSON, supra note 58, at 190, 202 (making a brief case for using RICO provisions).  
92 Garrett, supra note 24, at 47. 
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indications that if you do prosecute—if you do bring a criminal charge—it 
will have a negative impact on the national economy, perhaps even the world 
economy.”93 His view dates back to a 1999 memorandum, since labeled the 
Holder Doctrine, where he argued that prosecutors need to consider the 
collateral consequences for prosecuting large financial firms.94 Lanny Breur, 
the head of the DOJ Criminal Division, echoed this sentiment in 2012 when 
he said in a speech that prosecutors must consider the risks to the company, 
industry, and to the U.S. economy.95 Holder later retracted these comments 
during congressional testimony in 2013, stating that banks are not above 
prosecution if the circumstances warrant.96  
 This fear of prosecution also has roots in the failure of the accounting 
firm Arthur Anderson, which collapsed after a DOJ criminal prosecution for 
its role in the Enron scandal during the early 2000s.97 Also, no major financial 
firm has ever survived such criminal charges.98 Additionally, relatively 
innocent parties, like workers who would lose their jobs, and shareholders, 
may pay the consequences of corporate criminal prosecution.99 It is not clear 
whether these fears and the doctrine based on them are considered to be a 
well-founded excuse in the case of large financial institutions, though one 
analysis thought JP Morgan could withstand a criminal charge.100 Further, 
critics counter that this worry may apply to prosecuting institutions, but not 
individuals working for these institutions.101 Criminal prosecutions of 
executives would likely not bring down the institution,102 and financial 
regulators suspend or bar individuals from participating in the financial 
industry regularly. Regardless, in part as a result of these concerns, the DOJ 
                                                          
93 Rakoff, supra note 17; cf. SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL 
STREET TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN (2010) (noting that the reason 
these banks are so large is that elected officials of both political parties spent the past several 
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94 Cohan, supra note 2121. 
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96 See Court E. Golumbic & Albert D. Lichy, The “Too Big to Jail” Effect and the Impact 
on the Justice Department’s Corporate Charging Policy, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 1293, 1323 
(2014). 
97 Id. at 1306. 
98 Too Big to Fail, Too Powerful to Jail?, supra note 48, at 9. 
99 See Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Ben Protess, Criminal Action is Expected for JPMorgan 
in Madoff Case, N.Y. TIMES (December 11, 2013, 10:01 PM), https://nyti.ms/2FY5qVi. 
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101 Rakoff, supra note 17. 
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has adopted alternative practices for handling corporate criminals, as 
discussed in the next section.   
E. DOJ Alternatives to Criminal Prosecution 
 Since the early to mid-2000s, the DOJ has increasingly relied on 
deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) and non-prosecution agreements 
(NPs) as alternatives to prosecuting individuals or firms criminally.103 
Historically, the DOJ prioritized criminal prosecutions of individuals until the 
1980s.104 Recognizing the changing way prosecutors were approaching mafia 
cases, which attempted to bring down an entire criminal organization rather 
than individual mafia members, the shift to go after whole institutions, rather 
than individuals, was thought of as a step up in terms of the severity of the 
punishment and the magnitude of the case.105 Similar to the development of 
the Holder Doctrine, the failure of Arthur Anderson and other major corporate 
prosecutions from the early 2000s led officials to worry that the DOJ was 
being too aggressive, and internal memos shifted the approach.106 As an 
attempt to find a middle ground between an indictment and no charges, the 
DOJ increasingly relied on DPAs.107 This approach allowed the DOJ to 
extract big settlements and use the threat of an indictment to require internal 
changes to the corporation, while allowing firms to avoid criminal 
prosecution as long as they follow through on the stipulated reforms.108 
Typically, the DOJ will do enough research and investigation to find behavior 
that appears criminal, and use this as leverage to extract a fine from the 
institution.109 Take, for example, the case of J.P. Morgan’s DPA in 2013, the 
first for a major Wall Street bank, which stemmed from its role in facilitating 
Bernie Madoff’s Ponzi scheme.110 The bank agreed to the government’s facts, 
but the DOJ did not push for a guilty plea.111 J.P. Morgan agreed to pay 
several billion dollars in fines, $1 billion of which went to compensate 
Madoff’s victims.112 Supporters of this approach argue these agreements 
                                                          
103 For a detailed discussion of these agreements, see supra Section I(B). 
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allow the DOJ to reach a settlement to achieve corporate reforms that mitigate 
the likelihood of future crimes, all without the risk of firms failing.113 
 There are several downsides to the approach, however. First, because 
the cases do not go to trial, the DOJ prevents further details from reaching 
the public record.114 Instead, the public gets only a brief overview of facts 
that led to the settlement.115 Second, these agreements require different types 
of investigations, and because the case never goes to trial, attorneys never 
develop the skills to prosecute individuals.116 In other words, they fail to 
develop the needed expertise to make criminal cases against individuals and 
firms. Third, the terms of DPAs allow institutions to investigate themselves 
because firms hire former prosecutors to do an internal investigation, and then 
report to the DOJ with changes the firm promises to make.117 Put differently, 
the worry here is there may be too cozy a relationship between the contracted 
party and the firm—though others have worried that DPAs are ripe for 
prosecutorial overreach and are in need of reigning in.118 Fourth, and most 
importantly for the argument in this Article, is these agreements hold the 
wrong people responsible.119 The firm, employees, and shareholders 
ultimately pay the cost, rather than the individual executives responsible for 
the behavior in the first place. Consequently, individuals are rarely held 
responsible for their actions. In DPAs and NPs that name individuals (which 
is rare), the individuals are typically low-level employees who receive little 
jail time, if any.120  
F. Competing Priorities and Inadequate Resources 
 White-collar criminal convictions are in part a product of the criminal 
justice system’s capacity to find, label, and prosecute crimes.121 Financial 
frauds strain the system’s capacity because they are complex, difficult to 
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121 See Henry N. Pontell et al., Corporate Crime and Criminal Justice System Capacity: 
Government Response to Financial Institution Fraud, 11 JUST. Q. 383, 391–93 (1994) 
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prosecute, and require a lot of resources to pursue.122 In the years post crisis, 
key government agencies faced competing priorities about where to allocate 
limited agency resources, which affected their ability to pursue cases 
aggressively. The SEC gave more attention to Ponzi schemes and 
misallocation-of-assets cases than mortgage fraud, the former being much 
easier to take on and prove.123 The SEC was also severely underfunded to the 
point where it had difficulty carrying out its mandate.124 Further, its travel 
restrictions limit on-site visits to firms to investigate cases, and its limited 
resources hindered its ability to hire enough expert witnesses for cases.125  
 Similarly, the FBI had divided attention because the 9/11 attacks shifted 
its priorities toward terrorism.126 In subsequent years, the FBI reduced its 
employees dealing with white-collar crime by 36% and the number of 
criminal cases by more than 25% between 2001 and 2008.127 This was part 
of an overall 50% reduction in white-collar crime prosecutions under the 
Bush Administration.128 In absolute numbers, and for comparative purposes, 
the FBI had 120 agents tasked with investigating mortgage fraud in 2007, 
compared to over 1,000 agents investigating fraud during the Savings and 
Loan (S&L) crisis, a crisis much smaller in magnitude than the crisis of 
2008.129 Though FBI Director Robert Mueller approved a plan to allocate 
more agents to mortgage fraud investigations in 2008, the plan was scrapped 
after pushback from the DOJ, which worried that staff reallocation would 
harm other investigations.130 
 The DOJ also had competing priorities. In the years following the crisis, 
the U.S. Attorney’s Office had the most expertise in finance in the Southern 
District of New York under Preet Bharara, and they focused primarily on 
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insider trading cases.131 These cases were more straightforward.132 There was 
also a risk aversion to losing cases and a desire to win headline-grabbing ones 
related to insider trading, while banks were given a low priority.133 Though 
the DOJ had the makings of a case against Lehman, it chose not to pursue 
it.134 In part this risk aversion was driven by the acquittal of two Bearn Sterns 
mid-level executives by a jury that “put a chill” on further investigations 
according to one prosecutor.135 
 Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey also pushed against allocating 
resources toward bank fraud. In spring 2008, after Bear Sterns collapsed, 
Mukasey considered creating a task force to investigate mortgage fraud.136 At 
the time, he said the DOJ was trying to determine whether there was a “larger 
criminal story” to be told about the financial crisis.137 By the summer he 
decided against doing so, despite pressure from some Democrats.138 When 
comparing the need for a task force to the early 2000s task force for the Enron 
scandal, he said in public comments, “[t]his isn’t that type of phenomena,” 
arguing instead the crisis amounted to smaller “white collar street crimes.”139 
 More broadly, under President Obama’s administration, there was no 
“collective government effort” to investigate and prosecute financial 
institutions.140 Under the Fraud Enforcement Recovery Act in 2009, 
additional money was allocated to the DOJ for financial fraud, but only a 
small portion of the allocation made it to the agency.141 By executive order in 
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2009, President Obama also created the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task 
Force to investigate financial crimes. Despite big expectations, one former 
DOJ official referred to it as “the turtle” because of how slowly it moved.142 
In a 2010 press release, the DOJ announced: “To date, the operation has 
involved enforcement actions against 343 criminal defendants and 189 civil 
defendants for fraud schemes that harmed more than 120,000 victims 
throughout the country.”143 Despite these purported successes, it went after 
low targets, and many of its purported accomplishments were started before 
the initiative began, and several did not actually lead to criminal cases, 
despite DOJ’s claims otherwise.144 In 2012, the task force had 55 attorneys, 
FBI agents, and support staff—a small number compared to hundreds of FBI 
agents assigned to investigate Enron and about a thousand agents assigned to 
investigate the S&L crisis.145 That so few resources were “allocated to 
investigate and prosecute those responsible for an $8 trillion dollar event 
suggests not merely under-prioritization, but no prioritization at all.”146 
G. High Burden of Proof 
 DOJ officials also argued they were constrained by the difficulty of 
meeting the high burden of proof for criminal cases, proof of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.147 According to one former FBI official, going after 
financial misdeeds is “better left to regulators” with their power to level civil 
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fines.148 Part of the difficulty was convincing a jury that financial executives 
were behaving criminally when dealing with complex financial products.149 
The failure to convict two mid-level executives from Bear Stearns hardened 
the belief in the DOJ that the burden was too high to convince juries.150 
Further, prosecutors needed to prove criminal intent, which is difficult to do. 
Here the argument was similar to the “reckless innocence” explanation for 
the crisis: it is often difficult to distinguish between a crime and normal 
business practices.151 Untangling these can be particularly difficult with 
financial fraud. For example, mortgage fraud is more difficult to prove than 
other crimes because a prosecutor must establish a market price and show 
that executives intentionally overvalued the products, rather than simply 
acted with bad business judgment.152 
 This line of argument is weak for several reasons. First, prosecutors 
regularly meet the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt for white-collar 
criminal cases.153 Second, the idea that there is a lack of strong evidence to 
show intent and prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt runs counter to the 
fact that “evidentiary strength is generally a function of prosecutorial effort, 
priorities, and institutional commitment.”154 Similarly, former financial 
regulator Bill Black argues that one lesson of successful S&L prosecutions is 
that you find fraud if you look for it, but too often the DOJ was not looking 
for fraud among executives.155 Third, it is not clear whether the Bear Stearns 
case was a clear signal that criminal cases were unwinnable. The case was 
poorly tried by the government,156 and the government may have overreacted 
to one failed conviction and gone too far in the other direction of not pursuing 
these cases.157  
 Fourth, prosecutors may have more success if they used laws that 
allowed for easier cases. The statute pertaining to penalties in the Securities 
and Exchange Act provides for a standard of willfulness that would be easier 
                                                          
148 Id. 
149 Id. 
150 See Eisinger, supra note 13. 
151 BARAK, supra note 11, at 35. 
152 Maher, supra note 64, at 467. 
153 Richman, supra note 77, at 269. 
154 Id. 
155 Black, supra note 130, at 173. 
156 Rakoff, supra note 17. 
157 Id. 
126 CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS AND THE 2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS Vol. 4 
 
for the government to meet to show criminal intent.158 The willfulness 
standard does not require specific intent; rather, intent can be inferred from 
reckless behavior.159 In fact, many of the civil cases the SEC successfully 
pursued has laid the groundwork for the DOJ to pursue the reckless behavior 
argument.160 Under other federal fraud statutes, some circuits have held that 
recklessness is enough to satisfy the burden to prove intent as well.161 
Alternatively, prosecutors could use the well-established doctrine of willful 
blindness to show that executives have been actively ignoring evidence of 
bad mortgages at their company.162 This doctrine allows prosecutors to ask 
juries to infer intent through executive decisions to shield themselves from 
fraudulent actions in their company, and the Supreme Court has upheld the 
doctrine.163  
H. Bank Regulators Did Not Refer Cases to DOJ 
 Given the competing priorities and constrained resources discussed 
above, the DOJ could use some help building criminal cases for white-collar 
crime. Though the DOJ could build a case from scratch, one natural place for 
cooperation is from financial regulators. The DOJ “depend[s] heavily” on 
regulator expertise to help find and build strong cases.164 In the years before 
the crisis, there were four federal banking regulators, each supervising certain 
segments of the market: the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), 
the Federal Reserve, the Treasury Department, the Office of the Comptroller 
of the Currency, and the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS).165 Bank 
examiners from these regulators examined banks at least every 18 months, 
writing an examination report that detailed each bank’s risk level using a 
variety of criteria, which included asset quality, management quality, and 
liquidity.166 For the largest financial institutions, bank examiners engaged in 
continuous supervision, having their own office at the bank itself.167 
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Regulators also rely on Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs), which are 
reports made by banks or their employees when they notice suspicious or 
potentially fraudulent activity at their own institution, or in firms they interact 
with, such as appraisers or mortgage brokers.168 One major constraint on their 
ability to refer cases was the Bush Administration’s elimination of criminal 
referral coordinators at federal agencies who served as liaisons between 
agencies and law enforcement.169  
 Despite having eyes on the ground, and despite documenting the 
major problems that contributed to the crisis in the years leading up to it in 
their examination reports,170 the regulators made few criminal referrals to the 
DOJ.171 The number of referrals declined substantially from the S&L crisis.172 
For example, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency referred only 
three cases between 2001 and 2011,173 none of which were related to the 2008 
crisis.174 Likewise, the Federal Reserve referred zero cases related to the 2008 
crisis.175 The OTS makes for a good example here: during the aftermath of 
the S&L crisis, the OTS made over 30,000 criminal referrals.176 However, 
despite the 2008 crisis being 70 times as large as the S&L crisis, the OTS 
made zero referrals,177 and had not referred a criminal case since the year 
2000.178 Countrywide, for which there is a reasonable criminal case to be 
made, was supervised by the OTS on the eve of the crisis. Despite pressure 
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from consumer advocates to force the OTS director to regulate the company 
more closely and set up a hotline for whistleblowers, the director refused to 
do so.179 Thus, a “primary reason”180 for a lack of financial crisis criminal 
prosecutions is that, instead of helping gather the raw material to build 
criminal cases, the regulators were “not pointing the Justice Department in 
the right direction—or any direction—to prosecute wrongdoing.”181  
I. Capture 
 For some scholars, the above explanations are insufficient to explain 
the lack of prosecutions. The lack of criminal referrals played a role, but why 
were there so few criminal referrals from regulators in the first place? While 
lack of prioritization played a role, what explains the priorities chosen by 
agencies and elected officials? To answer these questions, it is necessary to 
probe deeper into the relationships underlying the political and economic 
order that fundamentally shifted power toward the financial industry and 
pushed government to be favorable toward it. These arguments range in the 
severity of capture posited between government and the financial industry.  
 The weak-capture version of this argument is that, at a time of 
potential economic collapse, the government prioritized the health of the 
financial system over prosecutions.182 Making sure the country avoided a 
debilitating depression required shoring up the health of financial institutions 
and making sure they could cooperate to stabilize markets. A basic fact of a 
capitalistic economy is that the government relies on private markets for 
performing certain public functions, so some degree of cooperation between 
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the two should be expected,183 which does not mean the government is 
necessarily captured.  
 A stronger version of the capture argument is that the government did 
not want to implicate itself by aggressively prosecuting the industry. The 
government, after all, had a significant role in fostering the circumstances 
that led to the financial crisis, including: deregulation that created “Too Big 
To Fail” (TBTF) banks,184 deregulation and lax regulation by financial 
regulators, encouragement of homeownership and subprime lending, low 
interests rates, as well as a large role in the messy cleanup after the crisis.185 
Because few in government believed the early warning signs of a brewing 
financial crisis and fraud epidemic, action after the crisis hit was difficult.186 
After the crisis, the primary concern was in making sure the system was 
returned to health, not going after bad actors.187 Though these actions do not 
necessarily mean the government engaged or sanctioned fraud in the market, 
prosecutors may be worried that financial firms and their employees could 
credibly claim that the government encouraged their behavior and they are 
therefore not culpable.188 Lending some line of credence to this argument, 
during a civil fraud trial against mid-level Citigroup managers, a jury voted 
to acquit in part based on the defense that government and industry were all 
engaging in risky behavior before the crash.189 However, the jury seemed 
willing to look beyond this argument in a statement asking why senior bank 
executives were not on trial for their role in the bank’s behavior.190 
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 The strongest version of the capture argument is that government was 
captured by the financial industry, meaning key governmental actors ceased 
to serve the broad public interest and instead made policy and regulatory 
decisions that served primarily the interests of the financial industry.191 Part 
of the capture story is the capture of Congress through lobbying and 
campaign donations.192 As the financial services industry became one of the 
leaders in campaign contributions and lobbying expenditures,193 both major 
U.S. political parties supported financial deregulation,194 leading to 2009 
seeing the highest level of financial deregulation in the previous century.195 
Deregulation also allowed the creation of mega banks that engaged in deposit 
taking, speculative trading, and insurance, which eliminated previous 
industry divisions that caused infighting over legislation. These in turn 
allowed the financial industry to lobby government with a consistent voice 
for deregulation.196 Even after the crisis, during debate over financial reform, 
when public antipathy toward large financial institutions was high, there were 
only a few small organizations lobbying for more regulation of the financial 
sector,197 leading one lawmaker to opine, in reference to Congress, that the 
financial industry “own[s] the place.”198 Several decades of deregulation 
coincided with efforts by elected officials, beginning with President Reagan, 
to reframe the approach to regulating crime in a way that grew increasingly 
adversarial and draconian toward blue collar street criminals while 
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simultaneously normalizing white-collar crime through deregulation and 
championing risk taking.199 
 In addition to elected officials, the financial industry also captured 
regulatory agencies. The FBI’s approach to investigating white-collar crime 
precluded the possibility of executive level financial fraud, suggesting its 
investigations were too protective of industry executives.200 The federal 
banking regulators were consistently lax in protecting consumers from 
predatory lending,201 and in reining in risky behavior.202 The SEC had a 
revolving door problem where its employees moved between the agency and 
high-paying law firms that represented financial industry clients before the 
SEC,203 illegally destroying a decade’s worth of documentation about 
investigations into Wall Street corruption.204 The SEC was also lax in 
monitoring capital at investment banks before the crisis.205 These behaviors 
reflect a problem of the status of the financial industry in regulators’ eyes,206 
stemming in part from the fact that regulators and industry players tend to run 
in the same cultural circles and view the industry as part of their “in-group,” 
with whom they have a relationship.207  
 Scholar Gregg Barak weaves these strands into a theoretical argument 
that he calls a system of “bourgeoise legality,” characterized by inadequate 
criminal prosecutions.208 The regulatory structure lacks the system capacity 
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to prosecute cases.209 Government “corruption” through campaign 
contributions and lobbying resources, combined with widespread financial 
control fraud210 by major institutions, led to a system unable and unwilling to 
criminally prosecute major players in the financial industry.211 
J. Synthesis 
 What are the strongest reasons for a lack of prosecutions of senior 
financial executives? Though the capture argument has some merit, a host of 
other more benign reasons also contributed to the lack of prosecutions. 
Without financial regulators referring cases, and with competing priorities 
and resources spread thin at the FBI and DOJ, the agencies certainly faced 
administrative challenges. Further, the Justice Department’s approach to 
handling corporate crime through deferred prosecution agreements was 
decades in the making, suggesting it did not make an abrupt turn toward being 
overly deferential to financial institutions in the wake of the crisis. Ironically, 
the shift toward criminally prosecuting corporations instead of individuals 
was intended to be an even tougher approach on corporate crime and was 
scaled back somewhat after the corporate scandals of the early 2000s, when 
the DOJ and others worried it was being too tough after the collapse of Arthur 
Anderson.212  
 Yet, there is still reason to criticize the approach, despite any 
constraints. Even granting that the DOJ genuinely and correctly worried 
about collateral consequences of prosecuting TBTF institutions, prosecuting 
individuals does not come with the same risks.213 And when it comes to 
individuals, there are simply too many cases left on the table, particularly in 
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light of the fact that the strength of the case and the evidence to determine 
that strength is often a function of actually pursuing the case.214  
 Here is where capture theory has some merit. The capture argument 
has been criticized, particularly the revolving door argument that most closely 
pertains to the DOJ officials who are making decisions about pursuing cases. 
Critics argue that the interest in being friendly toward industry in hopes of 
securing more lucrative employment after leaving the government is offset 
by the desire to make a name for oneself as a prosecutor, one of the best ways 
being to bring a high-level person to justice.215 If self-interest rules the day, 
then there are competing self-interests at play: both favorable signaling to the 
industry to achieve post-government employment and negative signaling by 
pursuing strong cases. Preet Bharara, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern 
District of New York, argues that the revolving door argument is: 
Ridiculous. It’s actually worse—it’s idiotic. Because when 
people are in government and they are responsible for 
prosecutions or for enforcing regulations, every single one of 
them knows that the bigger case they make, the bigger person 
they become and the bigger opportunities they have. That’s 
not a good reason to go do these things. But some people 
speculate that human nature being what it is, that’s how it 
works. . . . [Big cases against the industry] don’t ever hurt 
anybody’s career! And so for people to suggest that people 
like me or career prosecutors in this office are holding back 
from bringing a case against a bank president because that 
would hurt their career prospects, that’s idiotic.216  
Yet, these interests are not mutually exclusive. There is no reason a law firm, 
or the financial industry for that matter, will shy away from hiring former 
prosecutors who have shown themselves capable, regardless of the substance 
of the case brought. Further, if such a strong incentive existed, why were there 
so few U.S. Attorneys and DOJ officials trying to make a name for themselves 
by trying criminal cases against top financial executives, particularly when 
there seemed to be cases left on the table?217 Following the crisis, public 
sentiment toward Wall Street was unfavorable, so the lack of Wall Street 
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prosecutions after the crisis seems odd at best. Even key Wall Street insiders 
thought the government would be more aggressive in prosecuting at least a 
few executives to make an example and placate an angry public.218 Is there 
not a deep contradiction in the argument that prosecutors are fearlessly 
willing to resist the pull of the revolving door by making a name for 
themselves with a big case, and the risk aversion to pursuing further cases 
that the DOJ showed after the Bear Stearns acquittals? These problems 
suggest that even if key regulators were not completely compromised by 
industry influence, as the strongest capture critics would suggest, the 
regulators were certainly not operating completely independent of some 
weaker forms of industry influence. 219 A culture of deference toward the 
financial industry,220 developed in Washington, D.C. over the past several 
decades, explains why there was so little willingness to be tough on the 
financial industry post crisis. Without insights from capture theory, the above 
explanations leave some of the story left unexplained. 
 This Article now turns to Iceland, where the story of financial crisis 
prosecutions differs greatly from the United States. To what extent does it 
represent a possible alternative course for criminal prosecutions for 
individuals involved in the financial crisis? Are there any lessons for the 
United States? This next section gives an overview of Iceland’s financial 
crisis and how it combated fraud and abuse within its financial sector.  
III. THE CASE OF ICELAND  
A. Iceland’s Financial Crisis 
 The drivers of Iceland’s crisis paralleled those in the United States. 
Through the early 1980s, Iceland’s government had heavy involvement in the 
economy through regulation and state ownership of key industries, including 
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state-run major banks.221 Beginning in the late 1980s, and accelerating in the 
1990s and 2000s, Iceland adopted neo-liberal policies with “an almost blind 
faith in the virtues of the free market.”222 The economy went through a rapid 
period of privatization, deregulation, and financialization, coupled with tax 
reduction.223 More specifically, in the late 1990s, the government privatized 
key state assets, in industries including construction, telecommunications, 
and its three major banks.224 The growth and importance of the financial 
sector grew as the privatized banks grew tremendously, increasing nine-fold 
to approximately 865% of the country’s GDP (the second highest in the world 
behind Switzerland225), and with the establishment of Iceland’s Stock 
Exchange in the early 1990s and entry into the European Economic Area 
Agreement in 1994.226 These changes brought an influx of foreign investment 
as banks borrowed abroad and the Icelandic central bank was unable to 
adequately control the flow of money across newly porous borders.227 
Further, capital gains were taxed at a low rate, income taxes were cut, 
corporate taxes were reduced, as were property taxes, allowing investment 
and wealth to expand more quickly and helping the construction and housing 
sectors boom.228  
 Politicians and regulators encouraged these trends through 
deregulation and little oversight of the financial sector, convinced, like 
American regulators, in the efficient market hypothesis that financial markets 
could self-correct.229 One of the most consequential deregulatory decisions 
was to relax mortgage lending, where borrowers could borrow up to 90% of 
the loan, which added fuel to an economy already experiencing bubble 
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dynamics.230 Regulatory capture played a strong role as government officials 
pushed pro-business policies and the private sector rewarded them in 
return.231 Approximately 90% of the Chamber of Commerce’s proposals 
became legislation.232 These relationships were already strong given 
Iceland’s history of state-owned assets and patronage relationships with 
Iceland’s major political parties that permeated throughout the economy, 
epitomized by the power held by 14 of the most powerful families, known 
colloquially as “The Octopus.”233 Iceland’s history of corporatism, in which 
major industries largely controlled themselves and received backing from the 
government, extended to the major banks, which were sold off to private 
parties with close political ties to the ruling political parties.234 Even on the 
eve of the crisis, the ruling government parties trumpeted the financial 
system’s soundness in public events along with the key regulator, the 
Financial Supervisory Authority, publicly announcing confidence in key 
banks.235 Moreover, the regulators had no expertise in international banking, 
and were reliant on banks for financial and economic information.236 The 
regulatory agencies were underfunded and could not keep up with the rapid 
growth of the financial sector.237 International regulation was weak as well, 
and Iceland’s banks received little oversight as they branched out; buying 
assets overseas and international investors poured money into the Iceland 
banks.238 Overall regulation failed on three fronts: "Three potential sources 
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of prudential regulation—firms' self-regulatory risk management, Icelandic 
governmental regulation, and international regulatory processes—failed to 
decrease banks' exposure and Iceland’s vulnerability to crisis."239 
 In this environment, banks and individuals took on massive debt 
along with exotic loans which resulted in lending money beyond the 
borrower’s ability to repay.240 Between 2003 and 2004, Iceland’s stock 
market grew by 900% and the average wealth of citizens grew by 300%.241 
Its average income was the fifth highest in the world, well above that of the 
United States.242 Icelandic banks borrowed large sums of money from foreign 
investors, subsequently lending that money to private equity firms that were 
owned by friends of bankers, or even by the bankers themselves, with 
minimal collateral.243 This money was used to buy firms throughout Europe 
before channeling that money back to themselves and Iceland.244 Their 
financial relationships grew “incestuous” to the point where the failure of one 
would bring down the others.245 They took on extra risk, because they 
combined investment and commercial banking, the latter giving the former 
activities an implicit guarantee of government backing (though unlike the 
U.S., Iceland did not bail out its failed banks using taxpayer funds).246 Despite 
this rapid growth, leading banks hid their vulnerability from the public 
through corrupt loans and stock sales to each other, and misleading 
statements to the public.247 These actions were part of a larger shift in 
corporate culture in Iceland.248 The decade from when the major banks 
privatized until after the Iceland financial crisis (between 2002 and 2012), 
saw a significant increase in financial crimes.249 Also, the creation of a 
criminogenic environment, in which corporate incentive schemes pushed risk 
taking, companies searched for ways to stay within the letter of the law, but 
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avoid its spirit, by aggressively searching for ways to circumvent it.250 By 
2008, Iceland’s banks collapsed, along with its economy,251 in what was 
estimated as the third largest bankruptcy in world history.252  
 In short, many of the same dynamics that led to the 2008 financial 
crisis in the U.S., occurred in Iceland, but only amplified.253  
B. Criminal Convictions for Banking Executives 
 Iceland created the Office of Special Prosecutor (OSP) to investigate 
financial crimes that caused the crisis. Iceland had three major banks and the 
OSP brought charges against top executives at each. Most prominently, 
charges were brought against executives at Kaupthing Bank, known as the 
Kaupthing Four: its Chairman, CEO, a former CEO, and the second largest 
stockholder.254 They were convicted of market manipulation and making 
fraudulent loans.255 Each were involved in a deal that gave a Qatari Sheik 
millions of dollars in loans to invest back in the bank to shore up public 
confidence on the eve of the bank’s collapse.256 Though the Kaupthing Four 
touted the investment publicly, the fact that the bank was essentially investing 
its own money in itself was not disclosed.257 All received sentences that 
ranged between four and five and one-half years.258 The CEO of Landsbanki 
and the CEO of Glitnir bank were sentenced to a year in prison and three and 
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one-half years, respectively, for their involvement in loans to other companies 
to buy stocks in the bank, which violated breach of trust laws in Iceland.259 
By the end of 2015, Iceland jailed 26 bankers, handing down sentences 
reaching 74 years in total (with cases still pending).260 In 2017, several of the 
bankers who were found guilty began to appeal their convictions to the 
European Court of Human Rights to argue they did not receive fair trials.261  
 There was some accountability for political officials as well. Iceland’s 
ruling government was the first to resign in connection to the global financial 
crisis, in part because of the well-organized and effective protest movement 
in Iceland that arose as a response to the crisis.262 A commission created to 
investigate the causes of Iceland’s financial collapse accused the prime 
minister, finance minister, minister of banking and commerce, and three 
governors at the central bank of gross negligence, and recommended the latter 
to face criminal charges along with the head of the Financial Supervisory 
Authority.263 However, the state prosecutor declined to press charges.264 The 
head of the Financial Supervisory Authority was eventually fired for using 
inside information to sell bank shares on the eve of the financial collapse.265 
Parliament convened a special court to hold former Prime Minister Ger 
Haarde accountable for breach of ministerial responsibility. Though he was 
ultimately sentenced on charges of neglecting to hold meetings on the eve of 
the crash to keep the government informed, the punishment was 
suspended.266  
                                                          
259 Former Landsbanki CEO Gets 3.5 Years in Prison, ICE. REV. (last updated Oct. 9, 2015, 
14:57), http://icelandreview.com/news/2015/10/09/former-landsbanki-ceo-gets-35-years-
prison; see also Three Icelandic Bankers to Prison, ICE. REV. (Dec. 22, 2015, 11:30), 
http://icelandreview.com/news/2015/12/22/three-icelandic-bankers-prison. 
260 Ian Birrell, Iceland Has Jailed 26 Bankers, Why Won't We?, INDEPENDENT (Nov. 15, 
2015, 18:59), http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/iceland-has-jailed-26-bankers-why-
wont-we-a6735411.html. 
261 Iceland's Jailed Bankers Say They Were Scapegoats For the Financial Crisis, THE 
JOURNAL (Apr. 1, 2017, 8:30 AM), http://www.thejournal.ie/iceland-bankers-financial-
crisis-3314709-Apr2017/. 
262 Wade, supra note 254, at 7; see also BERNBURG, supra note 222, at 4–7. 
263 Lessons From Iceland, supra note 226, at 25–26. 
264 Id. 
265 Id. 
266 BERGMANN, supra note 228, at 170–71. 
140 CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS AND THE 2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS Vol. 4 
 
C. Comparing Iceland and the U.S. 
  Why was Iceland more successful in prosecuting financial executives 
than the United States?267 First, there are key differences between the judicial 
systems. Iceland does not use juries and instead uses independent experts who 
assist judges in understanding the case.268 In theory, this difference aids 
Iceland in white-collar prosecutions given that judges may be better able to 
understand the complexities of financial crimes than juries, particularly with 
the aid of independent experts. However, juries have convicted plenty of 
white-collar criminals in the U.S., including bank executives during the S&L 
crisis. The theory that financial crimes during the 2008 crisis were too 
complex for juries to understand is untested in the U.S., given that no cases 
against senior executives were even attempted. Further, there are mitigating 
factors that made prosecutions in Iceland more difficult. Icelandic courts have 
not been favorable to white-collar crime prosecutions in the past.269 
Additionally, the country’s small population made finding people with the 
expertise to prosecute difficult, such that, as the OSP grew, the likelihood of 
staff knowing and even being related to the top bankers was highly likely, 
risking a lack of independence.270 
 Second, key cultural and political-economic differences drove 
divergent responses. Iceland’s status as a post-colonial country informed its 
cultural values and shaped its political economy. On one hand, it had an 
impulse toward independence and sovereignty, while on the other, it sought 
to be integrated with the EU’s economy and its banks to pursue foreign 
investment and assets.271 The crisis forced a profound psychological shock 
and reckoning with this national identity,272 in which the behavior of bankers 
became entangled. Financial behavior that may have been placed in a legal 
gray area before the crisis was recast as illegal post-crisis,273 whereas U.S. 
officials maintained the distinction between immoral and illegal behavior. In 
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contrast, the U.S. has more difficulty reckoning with and stepping outside the 
national identity that defines its politics. According to Louis Hartz, despite 
political crises throughout its history, the U.S. has never strayed far from its 
commitment to Lockean libertarian individualism, which makes the U.S. 
hostile territory for political choices and movements that challenge business, 
capital, and limited government.274  
 These differences drove a third factor; the diverging political protests 
and governmental changes in the aftermath of the crisis. In Iceland, in the 
weeks after the banks collapsed, a grassroots protest broke out that eventually 
grew into the “pots and pans revolution,” which drew a large cross-section of 
the population.275 Though the movement strategically united around the 
broadly shared belief that political corruption was a major cause of the crisis, 
a survey of Icelanders showed that they placed the most blame on bankers for 
causing the crisis.276 Eventually, the center-right parties that were in power 
before the crisis lost seats and the country was governed by a coalition of left-
wing parties for four years. This political context provided more sustained 
support and a more hospitable environment for pursuing bankers 
criminally.277 The U.S. also had grassroots protest movements, but both the 
Occupy Wall Street and the Tea Party had stark ideological differences.278 
Though the left-wing Occupy Wall Street movement helped change the 
national dialogue around inequality, it suffered from internal divisions and a 
lack of engagement with institutional politics,279 whereas the right-wing Tea 
Party movement had more lasting institutional changes in Republican 
primaries by pulling the Republican Party to the right.280 Additionally, though 
the U.S. saw a change in presidential administrations and political party 
control shortly after the financial crisis, the changes were less substantial, 
given the two-party system in the U.S. and the relatively small differences in 
their governing philosophies. Furthermore, the Obama Administration 
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received criticism for retaining many of the financial regulatory officials who 
served in the previous administration, who oversaw and implemented policies 
that led to the crisis, as well as orchestrated the initial bailout.281 Given 
bifurcated protest movements and a moderate presidential administration, the 
political context in the U.S. was a less welcoming environment than Iceland 
for the radical idea of prosecuting bankers.   
 Fourth, the relative size and scope of the crisis in Iceland narrowed 
the range of responses. At the time of the crisis, Iceland had a population of 
approximately only 300,000. Despite a small economy, Iceland’s nominal 
bank assets had ballooned to 10 times the size of Iceland’s GDP.282 The 
effects of the crash were staggering: 85% of the banking system failed and 
50,000 residents lost all of their savings (constituting nearly 17% of the 
population).283 In contrast to the U.S., Iceland’s banks were too big to bail 
out and were not so integrated with external economies that others needed 
Iceland’s banks to survive.284 Thus, the U.S. approach of concentrating on 
banks’ financial stability using bailouts285 was not a viable option for 
Iceland.286 In short, while key American officials argued that banks were too 
big to fail, Iceland’s banks were too big to rescue.287 Moreover, Eric Holder’s 
worry that there would be collateral economic consequences for prosecuting 
TBTF institutions was not operative in Iceland because the banks had already 
failed. Together, these made prosecutions a more viable option.   
 Fifth, Iceland made a significantly stronger investment in human 
capital and resources to investigate and prosecute crime. Iceland’s Office of 
Special Prosecutor started small, and struggled to find a director initially, but 
by 2012 it had a staff of 100 employees, a caseload of around 200 cases, and 
40 indictments against banking executives.288 Comparing that to the U.S. on 
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a per capita basis, the size of the OSP is equivalent to the U.S. creating a task 
force of “about 90 thousand employees and a case load of about two hundred 
thousand cases.”289 Obviously, that large of a task force was not politically 
feasible or perhaps desirable, but Iceland’s investment provides a stark 
counterpoint to the United States’ lack of interest, and underinvestment, in 
investigating fraud.290 
 Sixth, the nature of Iceland’s prosecutorial investment is different. 
Whereas the U.S. invested in people in the DOJ and FBI, Iceland relied on 
an outsider named Ólafur Hauksson to head the OSP, a small town police 
chief who had no prior experience with financial crimes.291 Hauksson did 
have expertise in pursuing criminal networks and used these tactics 
effectively to gather evidence and to turn witnesses at Icelandic banks.292 
Perhaps his best asset seemed to be that he was willing to take the job; when 
the job was first advertised, nobody applied and only two applied after 
applications were sought a second time.293   
 What he lacked in expertise, he compensated with more independence 
from political and financial elites and a populist sensibility.294 He grew up 
middle class, having a sense of hard work and thrift from working jobs from 
the time he was a young kid.295 Though he tried to move beyond being a 
police chief, he was turned down for the job equivalent to the U.S. Attorney 
General.296 This independence was important because he brought a fresh, and 
different, perspective to the banks’ behavior. Whereas key elected officials in 
the U.S. and key figures in the DOJ adopted the reckless innocence 
framework to understanding bank executive actions, which treated the actions 
leading to the crisis as normal (though sometimes immoral) business 
                                                          
289 Gunnlaugsson, supra note 223, at 94. 
290 See infra Section II(F). 
291 Faris, supra note 283. 
292 Id. 
293 Id. 
294 Cf. MICHAEL PERINO, THE HELLHOUND OF WALL STREET: HOW FERDINAND PECORA'S 
INVESTIGATION OF THE GREAT CRASH FOREVER CHANGED AMERICAN FINANCE (2011) 
(providing a good U.S. historical parallel for Hauksson is Ferdinand Pecora, who was an 
outsider with little experience or expertise on Wall Street working as a District Attorney in 
New York City, but drew national attention to elite financial misbehavior preceding the great 
depression as chief counsel for hearings of the U.S. Senate's Committee on Banking and 
Currency in 1933). 
295 Faris, supra note 283. 
296 Id. 
144 CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS AND THE 2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS Vol. 4 
 
practices,297 Hauksson drew a clear distinction between business practices 
and wrongdoing, using this understanding to drive his investigations.298 The 
aggressiveness and results speak for themselves.  
 Seventh, the nature of the crimes in Iceland may have made it easier 
to prosecute banking executives. Some of Iceland’s bankers committed 
crimes that would have resulted in a conviction in the U.S. as well, while U.S. 
bankers escaped such punishment.299 This argument is a variation of the 
careless, but not criminal account of the U.S. financial crisis. Some of 
Iceland’s bankers’ actions would have made for much more straightforward 
prosecutions in the U.S., such as tax evasion and insider trading. For example, 
it is highly likely bankers could be jailed for the Kaupthing Bank case if the 
same actions were performed in the U.S. It is important to note this argument 
also presumes a willingness to extend these laws to financial executives, but 
this may be a good assumption given the aggressiveness and success of the 
U.S. Attorney’s Office in the Southern District of New York against insider 
trading.300 Yet, this argument misses the parallel between Iceland’s banking 
elite misleading the public about the health of their company, while evidence 
suggests internally they were much less optimistic and engaging in practices 
to mask their capital fragility.301 For example, though the specific accounting 
practices differed, the accounting gimmicks Lehman used to mask its 
weakness on the eve of its collapse offer a good parallel, and the DOJ decided 
to not pursue what could have been a strong case.302 
 Weighing the importance of these potential explanations is an 
imprecise endeavor, but some have more plausibility than others. Judicial 
system differences, cultural values, and the nature of the crimes are the 
weakest of the above explanations. At the macro level, the relative size of the 
countries and size of the crises left Iceland with a narrower range of responses 
to the crisis. Since Iceland had no chance to leave its banks largely intact, 
prosecuting bankers had little economic downside and some political upside, 
given the anger of the protestors and the broader public. At a micro level, the 
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choices of political actors outside government, and the politicians they 
elected, created environments that made prosecutions more palatable in the 
case of Iceland, and less so in the case of the United States. Within 
government, the choice in Iceland to prioritize prosecutions and the choice of 
an independent outsider made serious investigation into crime more likely. 
This latter option suggests a promising place for reform, as discussed in the 
conclusion that follows. 
CONCLUSION 
 What lessons can be learned about increasing the future likelihood of 
criminal prosecutions for senior banking executives? First, lessons from the 
U.S. suggest the statute of limitations may need to be lengthened for certain 
financial crimes to give law enforcement the necessary time to research and 
build cases.303 This is particularly important, given the complexity of the 
financial instruments that contributed to the recent crisis and the need to give 
regulators and law enforcement the time to understand industry practices.304 
Second, Iceland suggests the importance of appropriately balancing law 
enforcement’s need for expertise about, and connections to, the industry, with 
a healthy independence from, and skepticism of, it. It is noteworthy that 
Iceland successfully prosecuted executives despite the economic power and 
political interconnections of the banking industry that permeated Icelandic 
politics and society before the crisis. To the extent it can be said that the 
financial industry had meaningfully captured the political system in the U.S., 
the same could be said for Iceland, but even more so.305 Would U.S. law 
enforcement have been more aggressive if a small town police chief had been 
put in charge of investigating and prosecuting Wall Street? This is not clear. 
The aggressiveness of prosecutors after the S&L crisis, which is often held 
up as a good model to contrast with the 2008 crisis, did so with existing law 
enforcement agencies. To the extent U.S. officials want to encourage existing 
regulators and law enforcement agencies to be more aggressive next time, a 
group of former regulators and banking officials have put together a plan 
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under a group called the Bank Whistleblowers United.306 Their 
recommendations include stricter requirements on conflicts of interest for 
agency leadership, increased hiring of expert staff, and restoring criminal 
referral coordinators at financial regulatory agencies.307  
 These lessons presume that the criminal justice system’s focus on 
punishment is the best deterrent for the kind of behavior that produces 
financial crises. Jail may be a better deterrent for white-collar criminals than 
other classes of offenders.308 Yet, even after the aggressiveness in Iceland, 
there are still suspicious transactions in the newly emerging banking sector 
that cast doubt on the deterrent effects.309 Others worry that too strong of a 
focus on retribution will prevent the needed attention on creating the 
appropriate regulatory structure that can foresee and forestall the next 
crisis.310 Yet, these two priorities are not mutually exclusive; focusing on both 
could reinforce one another. Given the lack of criminal referrals from U.S. 
financial regulators, more attention to criminal actions could be part of the 
vigilance that is expected for them to have over the industry. A strengthened 
approach to criminal accountability signals to the financial industry that law 
enforcement also plays a part in oversight of the industry that compliments 
the regulatory apparatus. To the extent that incarceration is still the dominant 
mode of punishment for blue-collar criminals in the U.S., extending this 
model for their white-collar counterparts is appropriate as a matter of fairness, 
and to make true Eric Holder’s promise “that there is no bank, there’s no 
institution, there’s no individual who cannot be investigated and prosecuted 
by the United States Department of Justice.”311 
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